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decision by the refusal of their jurisdictions to accept the
risk of loss doctrine.
It is submitted that since insurance proceeds are not
always the true yardstick of damage to the property, legal
title to the insurance fund should be left in the vendor; and
that where the damage is not so great as to void the contract,
the purchase price should be paid less the amount of damages,
if any, which the vendee may establish.
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Plaintiff fell and was injured as a result of slipping on a
lettuce leaf lying on the ramp leading from defendant's store.
From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant
appealed. The lower court allowed into evidence testimony
that a few weeks earlier on two separate occasions someone
else had slipped and fallen on the ramp;
the first time
because of "some smear or wet spot" and the second time
because of "some green leafy vegetable." This evidence was
allowed to show the defendant's notice and knowledge of the
dangerous condition of the ramp. The Supreme Court of
Nevada held, in reversing the judgment, that the evidence
was prejudicial. They held such evidence of prior accidents
inadmissible when they were related to a temporary condition.
Eldorado Club Inc. v. Graff, 377 P.2d 174 (Nev. 1962)
Evidence of other similar accidents is admissible only
when meeting established judicial criteria. Generally, to be
admissible, the prior accident must have occurred at the
same place' and under substantially the same circumstances.2 Remoteness of time is also a determining factor
as to admissibility:3 The evidence cannot be admitted to
1. Lindquist v. Des Moines Union Ry. Co., 239 Iowa 356, 30 N.W.2d
120 (1947). Herein the Iowa Supreme Court overruled former decisions.
now allowing such evidence.
2.
Lyon v. Dr. Scholl's Foot Comfort Shops, 251 Minn. 285, 87 N.W.2d
651. (1958); Henderson v. Bjork Monument Co., 222 Minn. 241, 24 N.W.2d 42
(1946).
3.
Slow Development Company v. Coulter, 88 Ariz. 122, 353 P.2d 890
(1960). The Arizona court also treated the requirement of the same place
in a liberal way.
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show or prove negligence, 4 but only to show constructive or
actual notice constituting knowledge of the danger or defective condition.5
Some courts have tended to look with general disfavor
upon proffers of similar accidents occurring at the same
place where the plaintiff was injured. Their hesistancy is
seemingly based on the theory that such evidence is of
collateral matterf. The possibility of confusion, delay, and
prejudicial influence 7 coupled with the danger of trying to
establish difficult causess provides some rationale for their
point of view.
Due to such apprehension, there are some decisions in
accord with the principal case, 9 in holding that such evidence
will not be admitted on the issue of notice unless the condition is of a permanent nature. 10 Their reasoning is that
such evidence should not be admissible where it relates to
a temporary condition which may or may not exist from one
day to the next1" or where it is not shown that the conditions
surrounding the prior occurrence persisted and related
12
directly to the plaintiff's injuries.
Many courts approach this question with a more open
mind, allowing and anticipating the proper use of discretion
by the lower courts. 1 3 The authenticity of prior accidents
as related to the instant accident is always a matter of degree
which lends itself to a treatment as to weight rather than
14
admissibility respecting such evidence.
North Dakota's case law is both insufficient and outdated
for the purposes of anticipating a ruling in this particular
4. Jamison v. Ardes, 408 Pa. 188, 182 A.2d 497 (1962).
Co.,
146
So.
2d
451
(Ia.
1962).
5. Carriere
v.
Aetna
Cas.
Accord, Miller v. Muscarelle, 34 N.J. 574, 170 A.2d 437 (1961).
6. Brown v. Appleton Masonic Temple Ass'n., 243 Wis. 147, 9 N.W.2d
637 (1943).
7. Debes v. Morganroth, 48 N.J. Super, 39, 136 A.2d 896 (1957).
8. Torrey v. Congress Square Hotel Co., 145 Me. 234, 75 A.2d 451 (1950).
9. Eldorado Club Inc. v. Graff, 377 P.2d 174, 176 (Nev. 1962).
10. Moore v. American Stores Co., 169 Md. 541, 182 At]. 436 (1936); Dolan
v. Newark Iron & Metal Co., 18 N.J. Super. 450, 87 A.2d 444 (1952).
11. Boles v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 153 Ohio St. 381, 92 N.E.2d 9 (1950).
12. Moran v. Gershow's Super Mkts., 102 Ohio App. 408, 143 N.E.2d 723
(1956).
13. DiFrischia v. New York Central Ry. Co., 307 F.2d 473 (3rd Cir.
1962); Denton v. Park Hotel Inc., 180 N.E.2d. 70 (Mass. 1962).
14. Henwood v. Chaney, 156 F.2d 392 (8th Cir. 1946).
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area of negligence. 15 There has been no statuatory determination of the question.
It is submitted that the admissibility of evidence of prior
accidents to show notice or knowledge of danger causing an
accident does not readily lend itself to statuatory provision,
and that it will be incumbent upon North Dakota attorneys
to investigate thoroughly the court proceedings in other states.
Although the permanency of condition approach has a great
deal of merit, it may, if adopted as a criterion for admitting
evidence of prior accidents, have a tendency to place the
plaintiff at a disadvantage;
thus giving rise to unjust
decisions because of a lack of pertinent evidence.
PAUL CRARY

CRIMINAL
LAW - FORMER JEOPORDY - DISCHARGE OF
THE JURY BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF A MATERIAL PROSE-

CUTION WITNESS-The petitioner was brought to trial on
a federal conspiracy indictment. The jury was impaneled
and sworn, but before any evidence was presented a mistrial
was declared because a material prosecution witness was
absent. Two days later a new jury was selected and the
petitioner was convicted. The United States Supreme Court
held, four Justices dissenting, that this violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment- " . . . nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life and limb.
Downum v. United States,
83 S. Ct. 1033 (1963).
Generally a person is first put "in jeopardy" when he
has been placed on trial under a valid indictment before a
court of competent jurisdiction, has been arraigned and has
pleaded, and a proper jury has been impaneled and sworn
to hear the evidence.2 After jeopardy has thus attached,
15. See Chacey v. City of Fargo, 5 N.D. 173, 64 N.W. 932 (1895). This
lone case allowed evidence of former condition to establish constructive
notice of defect.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. Nordlinger v. United States, 24 App. D.C. 406 (Sup. Ct. 1904);
United States v. Van Vliet, 23 Fed. 35 (E.D. Mich. 1885). See, McCarthy
v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640, 642 (10th Cir. 1936). (Jeopardy attaches in a case
without a jury when the accused "has been indicted and arraigned, has
pleaded, and the court has begun to hear evidence.")

